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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over final orders of the Third District Court 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-103(3). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE #1: Did Judge Quinn misinterpret the remand directive contained in 
McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, ^ 38 when he granted the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment Regarding Fairness of the 2005 Waivers? Was the Appellant Sam 
McLaughlin entitled to a fairness hearing under that directive, or did Judge Quinn and 
Cookietree have discretion to proceed under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852 and 853? 
Standard of review with authority: The mandate of an appellate court binds the 
district court and the parties and affords the district court no discretion whether to comply 
with that mandate. Utah Dep V of Transportation v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, [^8, 208 P.3d 583; 
IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & KMgmt, Inc., 2008 UT 73, \ 28, 196 P.3d 588. 
Consequently, because the mandate is a legal determination, reviewing whether a district 
court complied with the mandate presents a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. See Amax Magnesium Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 
1994); Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
Preserved in the Record Below: R2135-2137, R2996-2998, R3485-3487. 
ISSUE #2: Was Judge Hilder's 10/26/10 Ruling and Order (granting Plaintiffs 
01/14/10 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and/or Declaratory Judgment and 
denying Defendants' 2/22/10 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and holding Plaintiff 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was entitled to a fairness hearing) the law of the case, and was it thus improperly 
reconsidered by Judge Quinn? 
Standard of review with authority: f,[T]he application of the law of the case 
doctrine . . . is ordinarily reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.11 In re Adoption 
o/A.F.K., 2009 UT App. 198, f 15, 216 P.3d 980; In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, % 32, 137 P.3d 
809. However, f,[w]hen a legal question is presented to an appellate court in law-of-the-
case packaging," id, the abuse of discretion standard must yield to the correctness 
standard of review. See id. f 33 ("We can identify no reason why an erroneous legal 
determination should be afforded greater discretion on appeal merely because it wears the 
garb of law of the case. For purposes of review, then, considerations of law of the case 
must yield to those of the substance of the underlying ruling when ascertaining the proper 
standard of review."). A.F.K., 2009 UT App. 198, f 15. 
Preserved in the Record Below: R3017-3018. 
ISSUE #3: The McLaughlin opinion held that shareholders in closely held 
corporations owe the other shareholders fiduciary obligations, which is a strict good faith 
standard of utmost good faith and loyalty. McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, f 18, 23. 
Did the post-remand corporate action, designed to deprive McLaughlin of a hard-won 
right to a fairness hearing, violate this strict good faith standard? 
Standard of review with authority: When "reviewing a district court's grant of 
summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, here Appellant McLaughlin." Id. f 14. Underlying \ 
determinations, legal questions, such as the scope of a shareholder's fiduciary duty and 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the validity of share transfers under the shareholder agreement, are reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
Preserved in the Record Below: R1825, R3003-3004, R3502, p. 9-10, R3503, p. 
13-14,22. 
ISSUE #4: The district court found that the Board and shareholder post-remand 
waivers complied with the framework for resolving nontransaction related conflict 
situations and completely resolved Greg Schenk's conflict of interest vis-a-vis the 2005 
Waivers. Was this a proper ruling as a matter of law when: (a) Greg Schenk again 
participated; (b) there was not a qualified Board; and (c) there were disputes of material 
fact relating to the adequacy of the disclosures, information made available and 
knowledge held by the allegedly disinterested Board member prior to those corporate 
actions? 
Standard of review with authority: See Standard of Review for Issue #3, above. 
Preserved in the Record Below: R1823-1825, R2137-2144, R2962-2963, 
R2978-2982, R3011-3014, R3487. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, 
Within weeks of this Court's decision in McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64; 220 
P.3d 146 (herein "the Opinion" or McLaughlin I), Cookietree, Inc. and Schenk embarked 
upon a course of conduct designed to thwart the specific language of ^ 38 of the Opinion 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and avoid, at all costs, the fairness hearing dictated by this Court. McLaughlin and Judge 
Hilder read the remand directive and found in it a clear mandate. Cookietree / Schenk 
and Judge Quinn read the remand directive as allowing alternative courses of action. As 
demonstrated herein, the remand directive specifically required a fairness hearing, 
because any shareholder vote must (and did) include Greg Schenk. Since he is the 
majority shareholder, President of the Board, and has heightened duties to McLaughlin 
whether he wears his "shareholder hat" or his "director hat" the only way to resolve the 
fairness of the 2005 Waivers is through judicial action under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
851. McLaughlin 1^3%. 
Course of Proceedings. 
1. McLaughlin I was decided on October 2, 2009. R1758 Paragraph 38 of the 
Opinion contained a remand directive: "We therefore remand for a determination of 
whether the [2005] waivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-10a-
851, which is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers were beneficial to 
the corporation and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the standard of fair 
dealing." (hereinafter "remand directive"). 
2. Remittur was accomplished on November 10, 2009. R1779. 
3. On December 18, 2009, a Board meeting was held. R1829. 
4. On January 6, 2010, a Shareholder meeting was held. R1835. 
5. On the basis of actions and resolutions at those two meetings, McLaughlin 
immediately filed a Motion for Partial Summary and/or Declaratory Judgment Declaring 
the Invalidity of Corporate Actions. R1876. The Motion was brought under Utah Code 
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Ann. § 16-10a-824(3), the company's bylaws, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-401 and Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(a). R1877. 
6. The Motion argued, among other things, that the corporate actions taken on 
December 18, 2009 and January 6, 2010 were improperly undertaken for the specific 
purpose of circumventing the remand directive. R1824. 
7. In response Cookietree and Greg Schenk, collectively, filed a Cross Motion 
for Summary Judgment. R1882. Cookietree and Schenk argued that the Opinion 
"remanded for further action to resolve the conflict of interest" (R1884) and asked Judge 
Hilder to recognize the December 12, 2009 and January 6, 2010 corporate actions as 
valid and effective to (again) waive the 1991 and 1999 stock transfer provisions and 
ratify the 2005 Waivers. R1887-1921. 
8. Judge Hilder, noting "the Supreme Court's remand appears to be 
unequivocal" (R2372) and citing Gildea v. Guardian Tide Co., 2001 UT 75; ^ 19; 31 
P.3d 543 and IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D&KManagement, Inc., 2008 UT 73, \ 28; 
196 P.3d 588 ruled that "in this case the parties and the courts are bound by the mandate 
on remand." R2374. Judge Hilder denied Cookietree and Schenk's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment and granted McLaughlin's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
ruling that McLaughlin "is entitled to the fairness hearing identified by the Supreme 
Court." R2374. 
9. Cookietree and Schenk petitioned the Utah Supreme Court to appeal 
interlocutorily from Judge Hilder's ruling. R2377. That Petition was denied. R2383. 
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10. At a subsequent Rule 16 Conference set for the purpose of scheduling a 
trial and obtaining clarification on procedure for a fairness hearing, Judge Hilder 
announced to the parties that he was retiring and that the case would be reassigned to 
Judge Quinn. R3501,p. 2-3, 10. 
11. Judge Quinn soon held a status conference with the parties on May 17, 
2011. Judge Quinn announced "Fm certainly not going to take the same position that 
Judge Hilder did. The efforts to remedy what took place in 2005 have no effect on what 
ultimately happens in this case because Fm not convinced that's the case. I think that the 
corporation can try and fix it. Whether they've effectively fixed it or not, I don't know, 
but I think that they can. . . . So why don't we invite [Cookietree and Schenk] to file a 
motion for summary judgment that addresses all of those issues.... Then I think I'd be in 
a better position to determine if there is any additional hearings necessary." R3502, p. 
11. 
12. Cookietree and Schenk then filed (another) Motion for Summary Judgment 
Regarding Fairness of 2005 Waivers. R2705. This Motion again argued that the 
December 18, 2009 and January 6, 2010 post-remand corporate actions "cured" any 
defect in the 2005 Waivers. R2707. The Motion also argued that the 2005 Waivers were 
fair as a matter of law, based upon allegedly undisputed facts. R2707. 
13. McLaughlin defended by arguing that "fairness" by its nature is a fact-
intensive inquiry (R2989 and Opinion, f 38) and demonstrating the existence of questions 
of material fact pertaining to fairness. R2950-2989. McLaughlin also made the 
following arguments to Judge Quinn: 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a. Judge Hilder's denial of the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
(paragraph 8 above) and refusal to recognize the post-remand corporate action was law of 
the case. R3017. Considerable time and expense went into briefing and defending 
against the December 18, 2009 and January 6, 2010 corporate action the first time. 
R3017. McLaughlin asked Judge Quinn, given the absence of manifest injustice, change 
of controlling authority or new evidence, to decline to reconsider Judge Hilder's ruling. 
R3017-3018. 
b. The mandate rule binds Judge Quinn and the parties. R2991, R3503, 
p. 6, 13-14. Not only are the district court and the parties bound by the remand directive 
(Opinion ^38) but they are bound by other pronouncements in the Opinion: 
"At the time th[e 1999 Stock Transfer] was made, it violated the 1991 
Shareholder Agreement. McLaughlin /, f^ 6. 
"[C]lose corporation shareholders [owe] all the same duties owed by 
partners - utmost good faith and loyalty to all shareholders of the 
corporation. Compared to the fiduciary duty owed by directors and 
stockholders of public corporations . . . this duty [is] 'more rigorous' than 
the 'somewhat less stringent5 corporate duty of good faith and inherent 
fairness." Id. at 18 (and expressly adopted in ^  22). 
"[Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their management and 
stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith 
standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in 
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the 
corporation." Id. 
With this holding, the Utah Supreme Court recognized "alternative 
remedies [] for oppressed shareholders" including equitable remedies and 
relief. Id. at^ f 22 and fn. 4. 
"The transfer of shares from Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk did not conform 
to the first right of refusal provision; therefore it was void unless the 
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waivers by the Board and three of Cookietree's shareholders were valid. 
A/ .atf31. 
"[T]he [2005] waivers ratifying the 1999 share transfer were tainted by a 
conflict of interest because they were both executed by Greg Schenk, who 
clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer restrictions of 
the shareholder agreement that were ignored when he received the shares 
by which he gained majority control of Cookietree." Id. at f 38. 
"By waiving the restrictions on the share transfers, Schenk and the other 
board members and voting shareholders deprived the company and the 
nonvoting shareholders of the economic opportunity to increase their 
investment in the corporation. Id. 
We therefore remand for a determination of whether the waivers were fair 
within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-10a-851, which is a fact 
intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers were beneficial to the 
corporation and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the standard of 
fair dealing. " Id. 
R2992-2993. 
c. The post-remand corporate action did not cure anything. The new 
waivers and ratifications were tainted by the same problem as the 2005 Waivers: the 
participation of Greg Schenk. R3011-3014, R3503, p. 6 lines 9-1L 
14. Judge Quinn ruled from the bench at oral argument. While he properly 
found that "fairness" of the 2005 Waivers was a question of fact for which summary 
judgment was not appropriate (R3503, p. 4 lines 7-12) he went on to rule that the post-
remand corporate action "completely resolvefd] any issue concerning the conflict of 
interest that was found to have tainted the original waivers." R3503, p. 4 line 23 - p. 5 
line 11. Specifically, Judge Quinn reasoned: 
a. The Opinion "set aside or reserved the issue or remanded the issue 
of the 2005 [Waivers] because they were tainted by a conflict of interest, and in doing so 
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the Supreme Court advised as its template the conflict of interest approach for conflict of 
interest transactions that's in 16-10A-851 should be the template for resolving this." 
R3503, p. 3 lines 2-7. 
b. "They also explicitly remanded for a fairness issue . . . " R3503, p. 3 
line 8. 
c. "The question can be fairly raised in light of the fact that that remand 
instruction was explicit. Do I have any discretion at all to consider the other two 
possibilities that are set forth in the statute, one of which is director's action by qualified 
directors, the other which - other of which is shareholder's action. I think that I do." 
R3503, p. 3 lines 14-19. 
d. "I don't think that in making [the remand directive] the Supreme 
Court intended to foreclose the possibility that the transaction could be addressed under 
the other two subsections [of 16-10a-851]." R3503, p. 4 lines 2-5. 
e. "I know Judge Hilder thought differently about that, but that's what I 
think." R3503, p. 4 lines 5-6. 
Disposition in Court Below. 
Judge Quinn revisited the 10/26/10 order of Judge Hilder applying the mandate 
rule, interpreted the remand directive as giving him and Cookietree/Schenk "discretion" 
(R3503, p. 3 line 16) and ruled that the post-remand waivers and ratification were 
effective as a matter of law to "cure" the violations of the 1991 and 1999 shareholders 
agreement whereby Greg Schenk personally obtained 545,200 additional shares of 
Cookietree stock to the detriment of Sam McLaughlin. A copy of the written 11/17/11 
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Ruling and Order prepared by Cookietree/Schenk and signed by Judge Quinn is attached 
as Addendum "A." R3480-3488. 
Statement of Relevant Facts. 
The Disputed Stock Transfer and McLaughlin L 
1. Greg Schenk is the majority shareholder and President of the Board of 
Cookietree, Inc. Sam McLaughlin is a minority shareholder and former executive 
employee of Cookietree, Inc. R1818. 
2. In 2004 Sam McLaughlin sued Greg Schenk for breach of a Shareholders 
Agreement which governed the sale and transfer of stock in Cookietree, Inc. The transfer 
at issue was the sale of 545,200 shares of stock to Greg Schenk from his father's widow, 
Anna Schenk, in 1998 ("the disputed stock transfer"). Rl-25. 
3. McLaughlin alleged that the disputed stock transfer violated the 
Shareholders Agreement's express provisions. R8-10. The transfer gave Greg Schenk 
majority control of Cookietree, Inc. McLaughlin 7, f 38. Had Greg Schenk followed the 
Shareholder's Agreement, McLaughlin would have been given the opportunity to 
purchase a portion of the 545,200 shares. 
4. In 2005 Cookietree's Board, including Greg Schenk and his wife, and three 
shareholders including Greg Schenk, voted to waive the provisions of the applicable 
Shareholders Agreement that precluded the stock transfer ("the 2005 Waivers"). R227-
228, R3481. Also, certain of Cookietree, Inc.'s shareholders, including Greg Schenk, 
voted to waive the stock transfer provisions. R230-235, R3481-3482. 
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5. The district court granted summary judgment on the 2005 Waivers 
(R1735), McLaughlin appealed to the Utah Supreme Court (R1739) and McLaughlin I 
was issued. 
6. McLaughlin I held the 2005 Waivers, through Greg Schenk's participation, 
were tainted with conflict of interest. McLaughlin I ^ 38. "We therefore remand for a 
determination of whether the [2005 W]aivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10a-851, which is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers 
were beneficial to the corporation and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the 
standard of fair dealing." Id. 
Post Remand Corporate Action 
7. Within weeks of the Opinion, on December 18, 2009, and at the request of 
Greg Schenk, the Board met. Rl829-1833. All three (3) Board members were present, 
constituting a quorum. Id. Greg Schenk is still a member of the Board. 
8. Unlike in 2005, Schenk and Rosemann disqualified themselves for conflict 
of interest. Id. The remaining "disinterested" Board member, David Rudd, alone voted 
to ratify the 2005 Board waiver and "presently waived the stock transfer provisions in the 
Shareholders Agreement." R3484. All three Board members then voted to ratify these 
actions of Rudd. Id. Rudd also authorized the same actions, in the form of Proposal 1 
(present waiver of the stock transfer provisions) and Proposal 2 (ratification of 2005 
Waivers and Proposal 1) to be submitted to the shareholders for vote at the upcoming 
annual meeting on January 6, 2010. Id. 
11 
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9. At the shareholder meeting, all shareholders appeared by voting proxy, with 
the exception of Greg Schenk and Harold Rosemann who were present personally. At 
the meeting, a majority of shareholders (including Greg Schenk and Harold Rosemann) 
voted for Proposal 1. R3485, % 15. A majority of shareholders (not including Greg 
Schenk but including Harold Rosemann) voted for Proposal 2. Id. at f 9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The remand directive in this case was specific and unambiguous. McLaughlin I 
found that the Shareholders Agreements did not anticipate the situation presented by the 
disputed stock transfer. Therefore, it remanded for a determination of whether the 2005 
Waivers were fair within the meaning of Section 851. Judge Quinn misinterpreted the 
remand directive and violated the mandate rule when he found he had discretion to allow 
other ways to " fix it.11 
McLaughlin successfully convinced Judge Hilder of this and a fairness hearing in 
accord with the remand directive was ordered on October 26, 2010. This order, after 
briefing, discovery and argument, became law of the case. Judge Quinn should not, upon 
inheriting the case in this posture, have invited and granted a new motion on the same 
basis. 
Cookietree and Schenk's post-remand action in immediately conceiving, procuring 
and seeking to enforce new ratifications and waivers, which all included the participation 
of Greg Schenk, violated the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing this Court 
imposed upon shareholders in close corporations by its holding in McLaughlin I Judge 
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Quinn erred when he found the situation had been "cured11 and that there were no material 
issues of fact surrounding the new corporate action. 
Lastly, it was inappropriate to grant summary judgment on the basis of the post-
remand corporate action. The same taint, Greg Schenk, infects the post-remand action. 
There are material issues of fact surrounding the adequacy of the disclosures made to the 
"sole disinterested director" and to the shareholder group. The Board action was 
ineffective because it was not the action of a majority of the directors present. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE MANDATE RULE REQUIRED UNWAVERING FIDELITY 
TO THE REMAND DIRECTIVE IN f 38. 
McLaughlin I remanded a three-part question: (1) Were the 2005 Waivers fair 
within the meaning of Section 851? Id, (2) Were the [2005 W]aivers beneficial to the 
corporation and its shareholders? Id. (3) Did the [2005 W]aivers satisfy the standard of 
fair dealing? Id, McLaughlin I called the remand directive a "fact-intensive inquiry." Id, 
Cookietree and Schenk sought to avoid the remand directive when they contrived, 
procured and sought to enforce the new, post-remand corporate action. Judge Quinn 
thereafter departed from the remand directive when he refused to hold a fairness hearing, 
instead granting summary judgment on the basis of thait action. This Court should not 
tolerate the intentional thwarting and frustration of its express directive and should 
reverse the 11/17/11 Order. 
The mandate rule dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on legal 
issues in a case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent 
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proceedings of that case. "The mandate rule binds both the district court and the parties 
to honor the mandate of the appellate court." Utah Dep't of Transportation v. Ivers, 2009 
UT 56, % 12, 218 P.3d 583. "The lower court must implement both the letter and the 
spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the 
circumstances it embraces." Id. In proceedings on remand, an "unwavering fidelity to 
the letter and spirit of the mandate" is required. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2004 UT 34, \ 5, 98 P.3d 409. 
Error occurred when the district court found that the remand directive instructs 
"the trial court and no t . . . the parties." See 10/18/11 Tr. p. 3 lines 23-24. Error further 
occurred when the district court decided he had "discretion" to consider the other two 
possibilities that are set forth in" Sections 852 and 853. R3503, p. 3 lines 14-19. 
Ivers held that both the letter and the spirit of an appellate court's opinion must be 
observed, along with "the circumstances it embraces." The Opinion found that 
McLaughlin had been damaged and unequivocally recognized the appropriateness of 
equitable relief to address those damages if the 2005 Waivers were not fair. Id. f 38 and 
fn 4. McLaughlin was denied his opportunity to have a fairness hearing and to prove 
damages. 
II. JUDGE HILDER'S 10/18/10 RULING AND ORDER WAS LAW OF 
THE CASE; JUDGE QUINN SHOULD NOT HAVE 
REOPENED THE ISSUE. 
McLaughlin initially defeated Cookietree's attempt at summary judgment 
following a nine-month-long effort at briefing, discovery and cross-briefing. R1815-
2371. Litigation procedures are enormously expensive for individuals. After oral 
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argument, Judge Hilder (correctly) interpreted the remand directive and declined to 
enforce the post-remand corporate action. 
Sua sponte, when Judge Quinn inherited the case, he indicated that he thought 
Cookietree and Schenk could "fix i f and invited another dispositive motion. 
McLaughlin respectfully asked Judge Quinn not to reconsider the 10/18/10 Ruling and 
Order under the "law of the case" doctrine. R3017-3018. When a legal "decision [is] 
made on an issue during one stage of the case," that decision "is binding in successive 
stages of the same litigation." Particularly when an appellate court makes a 
pronouncement on a legal issue, "[t]he lower court must not depart from the 
mandate . . . . " This is true even if the lower court "believe[s] that the issue could have 
been better decided in another fashion." Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 
T| 67, 82 P3d 1076 (alterations in original) (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 
P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995). 
Further, there were no exceptions to the law of the case doctrine to justify the 
exercise of discretion by Judge Quinn. Under IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D&K 
Management, Inc., 2008 UT 73, 196 P.3d 588, ^ | 34 three exceptional circumstances 
could justify departure from the law of the case doctrine: "(1) when there has been an 
intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become 
available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous 
and would work a manifest injustice." The Court did not find, nor did Cookietree or 
Schenk even argue, the presence of any three of these exceptions. R3341-3342. 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III. THE POST-REMAND CORPORATE ACTION VIOLATED THE 
DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
ENUNCIATED AND IMPOSED IN MCLAUGHLINI. 
Cookietree and Schenk were and are bound by the holdings of McLaughlin I "At 
the time th[e 1999 Stock Transfer] was made, it violated the 1991 Shareholder 
Agreement. McLaughlin I, f 6. "[C]lose corporation shareholders [owe] all the same 
duties owed by partners - utmost good faith and loyalty to all shareholders of the 
corporation. Compared to the fiduciary duty owed by directors and stockholders of 
public corporations . . . this duty [is] 'more rigorous' than the 'somewhat less stringent' 
corporate duty of good faith and inherent fairness." Id. at 18 (and expressly adopted in 
Tf 22). "[Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their management and 
stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard. They may 
not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to 
the other stockholders and to the corporation." Id. (emphasis added). With this holding, 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized "alternative remedies [] for oppressed shareholders" 
including equitable remedies and relief. Id. at f 22 and fn. 4. 
"The transfer of shares from Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk did not conform to the 
first right of refusal provision; therefore it was void unless the [2005] waivers by the 
Board and three of Cookietree's shareholders were valid. Id. at f 31. "The waivers 
ratifying the 1999 share transfer were tainted by a conflict of interest because they were 
both executed by Greg Schenk, who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the 
share transfer restrictions of the shareholder agreement that were ignored when he 
received the shares by which he gained majority control of Cookietree." Id. at <J 38. 
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"By waiving the restrictions on the share transfers, Schenk and the other board members 
and voting shareholders deprived the company and the nonvoting shareholders of the 
economic opportunity to increase their investment in the corporation. Id. Cookietree's 
Shareholder's Agreement did not anticipate or foresee a situation such as this. "We 
therefore remand for a determination of whether the waivers were fair within the meaning 
of Utah Code section 16-10a-851, which is a fact intensive inquiry focusing on whether 
the waivers were beneficial to the corporation and the shareholders and whether they 
satisfied the standard of fair dealing. " Id. 
The "letter and spirit" of the Opinion must be taken as a whole; Cookietree's/ 
Schenk5 s counsel only read the first sentence off 37 when they devised the post-remand 
corporate action. Therefore, in the fifth year of this litigation, Schenk, his lawyers and 
the company he controls, Cookietree, Inc., embarked upon a course of conduct designed 
to deprive Sam McLaughlin of the fairness hearing directed by this Court.1 The efforts to 
deprive their fellow shareholder of an appellate mandate were in bad faith and of 
themselves constitute a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing articulated in 
the McLaughlin I holding. 
1
 Usually a minority shareholder would be economically barred from continually fighting 
such tactics as these. McLaughlin is fighting a goliath. Cookietree has not only aided 
and promoted Schenkfs cause, but they have paid his attorneys' fees and costs as well. 
R3001. Here, McLaughlin believes so strongly in his evidence he has fought for eight 
years and two appeals for the opportunity to present the facts and circumstances of the 
disputed stock transfer to a fact finder. This Court should honor and allow that 
opportunity. 
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Within weeks of remand, Cookietree's/Schenk's counsel prepared a "disclosure 
document" which described] the facts and circumstances surrounding the 2005 Board 
Waiver and the issues associated with authorizing a new waiver." which was 
disseminated to and reviewed by the three members of the Board. R1830. Privilege was 
asserted for this document, which was not produced in discovery and does not appear in 
the record below. R2216-2217. 
A set of Minutes, prepared by Cookietree's/Schenk's counsel, reveals a veritable 
shell game of Board action, all discussed and conducted in 10 minutes time. R2978-
2979. Three Board members were present and two disqualified themselves to avoid the 
appearance of a conflict. R2978. The three Board members "determined to put the 
matterfs]" of ratification and waiver before the "sole disinterested director." R1830. 
That director, acting alone, then ratified the 2005 Board Waivers and presently waived 
the stock transfer provisions for the disputed stock sale. R1830. The two disqualified 
Board members then ratified that. Rl830-1831. The Board then resolved to put a 
convoluted Proposal 1 and Proposal 2 to a vote by Shareholders. Id. Those shareholders, 
which included the disqualified directors, then undertook a similar shell game of 
ratification of past waivers, present waivers, ratification of ratification and present 
waivers. R1985. 
2
 The record has been mis-paginated here. There are two R2978 and R2979. This 
citation intends to refer to p. 29-30 of the document at issue. 
3
 This refers to p. 31. 
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McLaughlin argued below that this conduct, designed for the sole purpose of 
preventing McLaughlin from getting his fairness hearing, was a violation of the duty of 
utmost good faith and fair dealing imposed by McLaughlin L The Court concluded that 
"there is no material question of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding the 
[post-remand corporate action] or the content of disclosures made to David Rudd and 
the shareholders in connection therewith." R3487. It was error, in light of all the facts 
and circumstances, to conclude that as a matter of law the duty was not violated in the 
procurement of the post-remand corporate action. 
IV, THE POST-REMAND WAIVERS WERE NOT VALID 
AND EFFECTIVE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND 
IT WAS ERROR TO RULE THEY WERE. 
Almost immediately after the issuance of the Opinion in October 2009, at the 
request of Greg Schenk and with the assistance of litigation counsel, Cookietree initiated 
action under Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-852 and 853. They prepared and then executed a 
ratification of the 2005 Waivers and prepared new, present waivers of the disputed stock 
transaction. For this strategy, Cookietree ignored the remand directive and focused only 
on the first sentence of ^ j 37 of the Opinion. Paragraph 38 of the Opinion, however, 
remanded for a fact intensive fairness hearing under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851. If 
the fairness inquiry into the 2005 Waivers (in which Greg Schenk participated) is "fact-
intensive" {McLaughlin I ^ 38) should not also the fairness of the post-remand waivers 
(in which Greg Schenk participated) qualify as a question of fact? R3503. Judge Quinn 
erred when he found the post-remand actions valid and effective as a matter of law. 
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A. Rule 24(a)(9) Statement. 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) McLaughlin here identifies challenged 
findings of fact and marshals the record evidence supporting the finding. 
"Prior to the meeting, David Rudd analyzed and reviewed documentation 
containing all of the material facts concerning the Stock Sale and the 2005 
Waivers." R3483, f 10. 
Evidence supporting the finding: David Rudd discussed the proposed Board action with 
litigation counsel. R29794, R3337. He reviewed the 2005 Waivers; he reviewed the 
Shareholders' Agreements; he discussed the proposed Board action with the other 
members of the Board; he reviewed the Disclosure Statement; and he reviewed 
McLaughlin/. R2761. Mr. Rudd reviewed financial information. R3337. Mr. Rudd 
testified that he considered factors, namely the Opinion and the disclosure statement, that 
indicated the 2005 Waivers may not be fair. Id. At the post-remand meeting, the Board 
discussed the 1999 stock sale, the 2005 Waivers and the Supreme Court's holding in 
McLaughlin I that the 2005 Waivers were tainted because Greg Schenk had a conflict of 
interest. R2733,f 48. 
Evidence to challenge the finding: Mr. Rudd did not know and still does not 
know material pieces of information which would allow him to evaluate the 
circumstances and fairness of the disputed stock transfer. R2978:>-2982. For example, he 
4
 p. 30. 
5
 p. 31-35. 
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does not know what consideration was paid for the disputed shares in 1999 or whether 
the provisions in the Shareholders Agreement setting forth how shares were to be valued 
were followed in 1999. R2978.6 He does not know how many shares Sam and Kim 
McLaughlin (and by extension, other shareholders) would have been able to acquire in 
1999, had they been given the opportunity or the value of those shares in 2010 compared 
to 1999. Id. 
David Rudd only knows one perspective (the one controlled by Greg Schenk and 
his lawyers). R29787-2979. He has never talked to Anna Schenk, the seller of 545,200 
shares. He has never talked to Sam McLaughlin, the shareholder who challenged the 
transaction. Id. He has never talked to Greg Schenk, the buyer, about the transaction. 
Id. He did, however, talk to litigation counsel and reviewed a (privileged) briefing/ 
disclosure document prepared by them prior to his vote. Id. 
Significantly, Mr. Rudd held, and still holds, certain material and mistaken beliefs 
of fact. R29798-2980. He incorrectly believes that, in 1999, Anna Schenk offered the 
545,200 shares first to Cookietree and that Cookietree's Board and shareholders went 
through a process of evaluating the respective rights of the company, and the shareholder 
had obtained waivers, both on a board level and a shareholder's level, to the stock 
6 p .31 . 
7
 p. 31-32. 
8
 p. 32-33. 
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transfer provisions and Mr. Schenk purchased the shares. In other words, Mr. Rudd 
believes the Shareholder Agreement was followed in 1999. R2980. 
Mr. Rudd believes the disputed stock transfer was fair to the shareholders in 1999 
because it is fair now, in 2010. R2980. However, one of the factors Mr. Rudd believes 
bears on fairness is the "contribution of people who run the business, who make the 
business successful, who add certain benefits to the business." Id. Even so, Mr. Rudd 
does not have any understanding as to whether McLaughlin was such an employee in 
1999 (or in 2005 for that matter). Id. In fact, McLaughlin materially helped build 
Cookietree into the successful business it is today. Id. 
When confronted (apparently for the first time) with the true facts surrounding the 
1999 stock transfer (i.e. that it was accomplished without the knowledge of the other 
shareholders and without being recorded in the company's stock transfer ledger or in 
contemporaneous Board minutes), Mr. Rudd stated that notice should have been given to 
all shareholders for the transfer to be fair and proper. R2980. However, this was never 
done. 
Mr. Rudd believes that parties to a contract, like a shareholder's agreement, have 
the right to expect that the contract's provisions are followed. R2981. Yet he voted to 
waive the stock transfer provisions in the Shareholders Agreement. 
The Disclosure Statement sent to the shareholders prior to the 
post-remand meeting fully disclosed all material facts. R3484, f 14. 
Evidence supporting the finding: The Disclosure Statement disclosed all material facts 
concerning the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, the Transfer Restriction Provisions, the 
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1999 Stock Sale, the 2005 Waivers, Greg Schenk's conflict of interest and the 
circumstances surrounding this litigation, and the Supreme Court's McLaughlin I 
decision. R2735. 
Evidence to challenge the finding: There was no counter-opinion contained in the 
Disclosure Statement. R2962. The document was drafted by litigation counsel and 
therefore subject to a reasonable inference that it was advocacy, not information. Id. The 
Disclosure Statement was single spaced, rambling and confusing to read. Id. There is a 
question of fact about whether the lengthy Information Statement and the Minutes were 
the result of a 10-minute Board meeting or simply rubber-stamped at that meeting. 
R2962-2963. 
The Disclosure Statement did not disclose other facts such as whether Greg 
Schenk provided consideration for the 2005 Waivers or the post-remand waivers (R2968-
2969), whether the waivers were the unilateral acts or the acts of counsel (R2968), 
whether Harold Rosemann (Board member and shareholder) received consideration for 
his complicity and facilitation (R2969, R2983-2984) and what the impact was. The 
Disclosure Statement did not address the issue of good faith or the adequacy of the 
disclosures made in the procurement of the 2005 Waivers and the numerous facts that 
could be considered in support of that issue. R2972-2976. 
B. The Post-Remand Shareholder Action Cannot be Effective as a 
Matter of Law, 
The immutable problem with the post-remand action, or any waiver of the stock 
transfer provisions under Cookietree's Shareholder Agreement, was articulated by 
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McLaughlin I. "The agreement [] provided that written consent from either the board of 
directors or the owners of at least two-thirds of the shares (excluding the shares owned by 
the selling shareholder) c[an] waive the agreement's restrictions on share transfers.'' 
McLaughlin I, f 5, 30. Because of the number of shares he owns, if Greg Schenk is 
removed from the equation, it is not possible to obtain a two-thirds vote. R2807, R2971. 
Additionally, Greg Schenk is President of the Board. Accordingly, McLaughlin I held 
"[t]he agreement failed [] to foresee the possible conflicts presented when a buyer is 
already a corporate shareholder and votes to waive the restrictions on share transfers." 
1f38. 
In justifying Greg Schenk5 s participation in the post-remand corporate action, 
Cookietree acknowledged: "Greg Schenk voted on [2010] Proposal 1 because his vote 
was necessary for waiver under the Shareholders' Agreements, as both Agreements 
require a two-thirds approval for a waiver not including the share of the seller in the 
transaction (i.e. the Boyd Schenk Shares).5' R1917. Greg Schenk, the person the Utah 
Supreme Court found tainted the 2005 Waivers with a conflict of interest, was a 
"necessary55 vote for the 2010 Waivers because of the provisions in the Shareholders 
Agreements. 
This statement is apropos of the holding in f^ 38: the Shareholders Agreements 
require Greg Schenk to vote. He is the self-dealing director/shareholder. This situation is 
not contemplated by the governing documents. The only way to resolve it is the remand 
directive: a fairness hearing. Schenk5s conflict of interest is res judicata. McLaughlin /, 
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^ 31, 38. Therefore, no vote of the shareholders could effectively waive the share transfer 
provisions violated in 1999 during the disputed stock transfer. 
Additionally and supplementally, there is a dispute of fact about the adequacy of 
the disclosures made to shareholders in the form of Information Statement. See p. 20-23 
above. If there is a question of fact about the adequacy of the information the 
shareholders had prior to voting, the post-remand action cannot be legal and valid as a 
matter of law. 
C. The Post-Remand Board Action Was Not Valid or Effective as a 
Matter of Law. 
1. The 2009 Board Was Not Qualified, 
Cookietree's Bylaws § 3.07 require that a quorum be present. Rl849-1873. 
Section 3.08 (R1856) states that "the act of the majority of the directors present at a 
meeting at which a quorum is present shal l . . . be the act of the Board." This is in accord 
with Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-824(3). 
Since three (3) Board members were present for a quorum at the 12/18/09 
meeting, the 12/18/09 acts, resolutions and recommendations could not have been "the 
act of the majority of directors present" since only one (1) Board member voted. One of 
three is not a majority. Therefore, the ratification of the 2005 Waivers made solely by 
Rudd, the present waiver approved by Rudd, the recommendation to the shareholders in 
favor of Proposal 1 and Proposal 2 made solely by Rudd, and the submission of Proposal 
1 and Proposal 2 to the shareholders solely by Rudd are invalid as a matter of law. The 
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district court erred when it held otherwise and recognized the post-remand corporate 
action as effective. 
2. Even if the Board was Qualified, Disputes of Fact Regarding the 
Adequacy and Fairness of Rudd's Information Preclude the Entry 
of Summary Judgment on the Post-Remand Board Waiver. 
When deposed, Mr. Rudd revealed a fundamental lack of understanding about the 
disputed stock transfer itself, the circumstances of the 2005 Waivers and could not 
articulate why the 2005 Waivers were fair. A copy of his entire deposition is contained 
in the record at R2147-2251. Mr. Rudd is a very busy man; he is a practicing lawyer and 
he sits on other boards for other companies (one other, in fact, with Greg Schenk). Mr. 
Rudd made no effort to investigate or understand both sides of the disputed stock transfer 
issue. He simply swallowed what Cookietree's counsel provided to him in the 10 minute 
discussion at the Board Meeting and signed off on the minutes they prepared. It was 
improper to find, as a matter of law, and given the record evidence to refute that finding, 
that Mr. Rudd "analyzed and reviewed all material facts." 
CONCLUSION 
The parties and the trial court were bound by the Utah Supreme Court's remand 
directive for a fairness hearing. The procurement and judicial recognition of new waivers 
violated the letter and spirit of the mandate. Even so, the post-remand waivers are 
contaminated by the same problem as the 2005 Waivers: the participation of Greg 
Schenk. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL R. McLAUGHLIN et al., I [PROPOSED] RULING AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, Case Nos.: 040924997, 050906729 
(consolidated) 
v. 
Judge: Anthony Quinn 
GREG SCHENK et al , 
Defendants. 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Defendants Greg Schenk and Cookietree, 
Inc.'s ("Cookietree") Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Fairness of 2005 Waivers (the 
"Motion"). Defendants Anna Schenk and the Estate of Boyd Schenk (the "Estate") joined in the 
Motion. The Court has considered the materials submitted in support of and in opposition to the 
Motion, including the Motion itself and all supporting materials; Anna Schenk and the Estate's 
joinder; Plaintiff Samuel R. McLaughlin's ("McLaughlin") opposition and supporting materials; 
Greg Schenk and Cookietree's reply memorandum and supporting materials; and the record and 
file herein. In addition, the Court heard argument of counsel on October 18, 201L 
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BACKGROUND 
1. On August 16, 1999, the Estate (administered by Anna Schenk) sold 545,200 
shares of Cookietree common stock to Greg Schenk pursuant to a Stock Purchase and Sale 
Agreement (the "Stock Sale"). {See August 19, 1999 Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement, 
attached to the Affidavit of Harold Rosemann (the "Rosemann Aff") (Ex. 1 to the Motion) as 
Ex.6.) 
2. In November 2004, McLaughlin, a minority shareholder and former employee of 
Cookietree, commenced the instant lawsuit, in which he alleged, among other things, that the 
Stock Sale was made in violation of a 1991 agreement among Cookietree and certain of its 
shareholders (the "1991 Shareholders' Agreement") that placed certain restrictions on the sale or 
transfer of Cookietree common stock (the "Transfer Restriction Provisions"). {See Compl., on 
file herein.) 
3. On May 17, 2005, Cookietree's Board of Directors (the "Board") (consisting of 
Greg Schenk, Cookietree's President; his wife, Gayle Schenk; and Harold Rosemann, 
Cookietree's Treasurer) adopted a resolution by means of a unanimous written consent of the 
members of the Board that waived the Transfer Restriction Provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement to the Stock Sale (the "2005 Board Waiver"). {See 2005 Board Waiver, attached to 
the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 8.) 
4. On the same day, the then owners of more than two-thirds of the shares of the 
common stock of Cookietree subject to the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement (excluding the shares 
at issue in the Stock Sale) executed a Waiver and Consent that waived the Transfer Restriction 
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) 
Provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock Sale (the "2005 Shareholders' 
Waiver"). (See 2005 Shareholders' Waiver, attached to the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 9.) The 2005 
Board and Shareholders' Waivers are collectively referred to as the "2005 Waivers." 
5. In the Utah Supreme Court's decision in this matter, McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 
UT 64, 220 P.3d 146, the Supreme Court affirmed all of this Court's prior rulings dismissing 
McLaughlin's claims against defendants, with one exception: the Court determined that the 
2005 Waivers "were tainted by a conflict of interest because they were both executed by Greg 
Schenck, who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the [Transfer Restriction Provisions]." 
A/438. 
6. Because the 2005 Waivers did not entail a "transaction" by or with Cookietree, 
and therefore were not subject to the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act (the "Corporation 
Act"), id. U 35, the Utah Supreme Court adopted new procedures for dealing with 
"nontransaction-related conflict situations." Id. f 37. 
7. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a nontransaction-related 
conflict situation may be resolved via any one of the three options set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-851: (1) disinterested board members may vote to ratify the nontransaction-related 
conflict situation, (2) disinterested shareholders may vote to ratify the nontransaction-related 
conflict situation, or (3) the party with a conflict may show that the nontransaction-related 
conflict situation was fair. See id. ("The procedures provided in the conflict of interest statute 
most appropriately address nontransaction-related conflict situations because they do not 
automatically invalidate conflict of interest transactions but instead require the party with a 
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conflict to show the transaction was fair, or require the vote of disinterested board members or 
disinterested shareholders to ratify the transaction." (citing Utah Code Ann. §16-1 Oa-851 
(2005))). "In adopting these procedures for nontransaction-related conflicts, [the Utah Supreme 
Court] recognize[d] that many aspects of corporate governance are unfair." Id. 
8. The Utah Supreme Court then "remand[ed] for a determination of whether the 
[2005 Waivers] were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-1 Oa-851, which is a fact-
intensive inquiry focusing on whether the [2005] [W]aivers were beneficial to the corporation 
and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the standard of fair dealing." Id. f 38. 
9. Following the McLaughlin decision, each of Cookietree's current Board and 
shareholders took action to ratify the 2005 Waivers, and thus cure the nontransaction-related 
conflict situation, in accordance with the new framework adopted in the McLaughlin decision. 
10. On December 18,2009, Cookietree held a meeting of its Board. At that time, the 
Board members were Greg Schenk, Cookietree's President; Harold Rosemann, Cookietree's 
Chief Financial Officer; and David Rudd, who is not (and never has been) employed by 
Cookietree. Prior to the meeting, David Rudd analyzed and reviewed documentation containing 
all of the material facts concerning the Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers, including, but not 
limited to, the 2005 Waivers themselves, the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, Cookietree's 
financial statements and other financial information, and the McLaughlin decision. 
11. At the meeting, David Rudd, as the sole disinterested or "qualified" member of 
the Board, after full disclosure by Greg Schenk, adopted the following resolutions: 
(a) ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver (the "2009 Board Ratification"); and 
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(b) present waiver of the Transfer Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale. 
(See Board Minutes (Dec. 18, 2009) at 2, attached to the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 11.) 
12. After David Rudd took the foregoing actions on behalf of Cookietree, all three 
Board members then voted to set the time and place of the annual shareholders' meeting and 
resolved that the matters of business to come before the shareholders included, among other 
things: 
(a) the present waiver by the shareholders of the Transfer Restriction Provisions to 
the Stock Sale ("Proposal 1"); and 
(b) ratification of the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver and the current shareholders' 
waiver contemplated in Proposal 1 ("Proposal 2"). 
(See id. at 2-3.) 
13. On December 21, 2009, Cookietree's corporate secretary (Harold Rosemann) sent 
all of the shareholders of Cookietree a notice of the 2009 annual shareholders' meeting (which 
was to be held on January 6, 2010), an information statement concerning Proposals 1 and 2 (the 
"Disclosure Statement"), and a proxy. (The notice, Disclosure Statement, and proxy are attached 
to the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 12.) 
14. The Disclosure Statement fully disclosed all material facts concerning the 1991 
Shareholders' Agreement, the Transfer Restriction Provisions, the Stock Sale, the 2005 Waivers, 
Greg Schenk's conflict of interest and the circumstances surrounding this litigation, and the Utah 
Supreme Court's McLaughlin decision. (See Disclosure Statement at 1-6.) A copy of the 
McLaughlin decision was enclosed with the Disclosure Statement. 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15. At the 2009 shareholders' meeting, shareholders owning 4,113,400 shares of the 
common stock of Cookietree were present, in person or by proxy, out of the 4,124,650 shares 
issued, outstanding, and entitled to vote at the meeting. With respect to Proposal 1—to presently 
waive the Transfer Restriction Provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock 
Sale—3,168,200 shares were voted in favor of the proposal and 400,000 shares (owned by the 
McLaughlins) were voted against. This 3,168,200 did not include the shares at issue in the Stock 
Sale, but did include Greg Schenk's remaining shares, pursuant to the waiver requirements of the 
1991 Shareholders' Agreement. The Inspector of Election/Voting Judge (Harold Rosemann) 
also announced at the meeting that 987,000 "qualified shares" (shares excluding all those owned 
by Greg Schenk) were voted in favor of Proposal 1 and 400,000 "qualified shares" (owned by the 
McLaughlins) were voted against Proposal 1. It was thus resolved that the shareholders 
presently waived the Transfer Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale (the "2009 Shareholders' 
Waiver"). {See Shareholder Minutes at 1, attached to the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 13; Certificate 
and Report of Inspector of Election/Voting Judge ("Certificate of Voting") at 2-3, attached to the 
Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 14.) 
16. With respect to Proposal 2—to ratify the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver and the 2009 
Shareholders' Waiver—987,000 "qualified shares" (shares excluding all those owned by Greg 
Schenk) were voted in favor of Proposal 2 and 400,000 "qualified shares" (owned by the 
McLaughlins) were voted against Proposal 2. It was noted at the meeting that Greg Schenk did 
not vote on Proposal 2. It was thus resolved that the owners of a majority of the disinterested or 
"qualified" shares ratified (1) the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver; and (2) the 2009 Shareholders' 
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Waiver (the "2009 Shareholders' Ratification"). (See Shareholder Minutes at 4; Certificate of 
Voting at 7.) The 2009 Board and Shareholders' Ratifications are collectively referred to as the 
"2009 Ratifications." 
17. On June 30, 2011, Greg Schenk and Cookietree filed the instant Motion. In the 
Motion, Greg Schenk and Cookietree argued that, as a result of the 2009 Ratifications, a judicial 
determination regarding the fairness of the 2005 Waivers is unnecessary, because the 2009 
Ratifications effectively resolved the nontransaction-related conflict situation identified by the 
Utah Supreme Court in McLaughlin. Greg Schenk and Cookietree further argued that to the 
extent a judicial determination of fairness vis-a-vis the 2005 Waivers is required, based upon the 
undisputed facts, the 2005 Waivers were fair to Cookietree and its shareholders as a matter of 
law. As noted above, Anna Schenk and the Estate joined in the Motion. 
RULING AND ORDER 
At the outset, the Court considered whether it has the discretion to consider avenues other 
than a fairness hearing under the McLaughlin decision and Section 16-10a-851 of the 
Corporation Act—i.e., a vote of disinterested directors and/or shareholders—for resolving a 
nontransation-related conflict situation. The Court believes that the Utah Supreme Court did not 
address this question in McLaughlin, as it could only address the dispute before it. Further, 
nowhere in the McLaughlin decision did the Utah Supreme Court prohibit Cookietree's 
disinterested Board member and/or disinterested shareholders from taking action anew pursuant 
to Section 16-10a-851 of the Corporation Act to resolve Greg Schenk's conflict of interest, nor 
does the McLaughlin decision explain why such action would be unavailable in this case. For 
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these reasons, the Court concludes that it has the discretion to consider other avenues for 
resolving the nontransation-related conflict inherent in the 2005 Waivers, namely the 2009 
Ratifications. 
With regard to the 2009 Ratifications, the Court concludes that there is no material 
question of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding the 2009 Ratifications, or the content 
of disclosures made to David Rudd and the shareholders in connection therewith. As such, the 
Court has concluded that it may decide the validity of the 2009 Ratifications—and whether they 
effectively resolved the nontransaction-related conflict situation at issue—at the summary 
judgment stage. 
The Court concludes that the 2009 Ratifications complied with the framework for 
resolving nontransaction-related conflict situations set forth in the McLaughlin decision and 
Section 16-10a-851 of the Corporation Act, and thus completely resolved Greg Schenk's conflict 
of interest vis-a-vis the 2005 Waivers. Greg Schenk made required disclosure to David Rudd 
and the shareholders prior to the 2009 Ratifications. Further, the 2009 Board Ratification was 
made by a "qualified" Board (made up of one disinterested or "qualified" member, David Rudd), 
and the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification was likewise made by a majority of the disinterested or 
"qualified" shareholders of Cookietree, whether or not Greg Schenk's and Harold Rosemann's 
shares were counted. Importantly, however, in accordance with the McLaughlin decision, Greg 
Schenk did not vote any of his shares on the proposal to ratify the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver. 
As a matter of law, then, the Court concludes that such actions have completely resolved Greg 
Schenk's conflict of interest vis-a-vis the 2005 Waivers and rendered any fairness hearing (or 
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other further proceedings in this case) moot. Indeed, the Corporation Act provides that if 
directors' or shareholders' action is taken to ratify a conflicted transaction or "nontransaction" 
(as is the case here), the "transaction may not be enjoined, be set aside, or give rise to an award 
of damages or other sanctions" as a matter of law. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851(2). 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. The Motion is hereby GRANTED insofar as the Court has concluded that the 
2009 Ratifications effectively resolved Greg Schenk's conflict of interest vis-a-vis the 2005 
Waivers as a matter of law (the Court has reached no conclusion regarding the fairness of the 
2005 Waivers); 
2. All of McLaughlin's remaining claims against defendants Greg Schenk, 
Cookietree, Anna Schenk, and the Estate are dismissed with prejudice and without recovery of 
any kind; and 
3. The Court hereby directs the entry of final judgment of dismissal as to the 
consolidated cases. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of 7#t/lS , 2011.
 s '" "\ :^  
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